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THE UNITED STATES AS A RECEIVING STATE
By

ROBERT

B.

ELLERT *

IN

THE five years since the President ratified the NATO SOF Agreement 1on
24 July 1953 almost no legislation has been enacted by Congress to implement
this treaty within the United States. Conversely, France, Great Britain, Italy
and the other signatories have found ways to overcome their constitutional
barriers and have initiated procedures designed to guarantee the success of this
all important defense measure.
In considering this present laches on the part of the United States in implementing the provisions of the Agreement, it is interesting to note that historically
this country has been reluctant to enact domestic legislation providing absolute
immunity to foreign troops stationed in the United States. This has been true,
even though the United States had agreed to such arrangements with various
foreign countries during World War II, in return for like concessions for
American troops by the countries concerned.
The only legislation dealing with foreign friendly forces during World
War II was the Friendly Foreign Forces Service Courts Act, enacted in 1944.,
* Major, U.S.A.; B.A., B.C.L., College of William and Mary; Postgraduate Law Diplomate,
Kings College, London University. The opinions and conclusions expressed here are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the view of either The Judge Advocate General's School, U. S. Army, or any other governmental agency. References to this study should include the foregoing statment.
1 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their
Forces, June 19, 1951, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, henceforth referred to as Agreement. The following
NATO countries have ratified the Agreement: France, Norway and Belgium-Aug. 23, 1953;
Canada-Sept. 27, 1953; The Netherlands-Dec. 18, 1953; Luxenbourg-April .18, 1954; United
Kingdom-June 12, 1954; Turkey-June 17, 1954; Denmark-June 27, 1954; Greece-Aug. 25,
1954; Portugal-Dec. 22, 1955; Italy-Jan. 21, 1956.
2 Only the claims provisions of Article VIII of the Agreement have been implemented by the
Act of August 31, 1954, 68 Stat. 1006, C. 1152, 31 U.S.C. § 224i. The Claims Division, Office of
The Judge Advocate General of the Army, Fort Holabird, Md. has been designated as the Receiving
State Office for claims cognizable under the Agreement. Such claims should be filed with the
nearest United States Armed Forces installation to the place where the accident or incident occurred.
3 In 23 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 338 (1946),
M.F. Bathhurst in an article entitled Jurisdiction over
Friendly Foreign Armed Forces-The American Law asserts that the reason the U.S. failed to make
similar arrangements as to exemptions from criminal jurisdiction for British troops in the U.S. during
World War 11 as was granted U.S. troops in the United Kingdom was because the U.S. believed
that such immunity already existed in the U.S. and that accordingly legislation was not needed to
confer this jurisdiction. (But see Cong. Record, Senate, 22 June 1944, pg. 6569, pg. 6572 Senator
Murdoch, and pg. 6577, Senator Connolly, for the contrary view that such exclusive jurisdiction on
the part of foreign troops did not exist and that it was not considered advisable or possible for
Congress to make such a concession to members of friendly foreign forces in the U.S.)
458 Stat. 643, 22 U.S.C. 701 (1944). This Act became operative with respect to the military,
naval or air forces of any foreign State only after a finding and declaration by the President that the
powers and privileges provided by the Act were necessary for the maintenance of discipline. By
Proc. No. 2626, Oct. 12, 1944 it was declared operative for the forces of the United Kingdom and
Canada. This Proclamation was revoked by Proc. No. 3107, Aug. 9, 1955. The restrictive application of th e provisions of this Act also tends to refurbish the criticism of the contentions of M.E.
Bathhurst, supra.
[75]
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This act, while recognizing the right of a service court of a friendly nation to
function under certain circumstances in the United States, cannot be construed
as according the friendly foreign force in the United States absolute immunity
from the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal and State courts.
An eminent British writer in commenting on this anomaly stated:
"Ithas not been difficult to detect in the attitude of the United States of
America towards the subject of the exercise of jurisdiction over visiting forces a
dualism of approach, which justified it in denying at home a right that it
claimed for itself abroad. Until the conclusion of the Status of Forces Agreement, the evidence of the practice of the United States of America was apparently
equivocal." 5
The NATO SOF Agreement is a multi-lateral treaty which defines the
immunities, rights, privileges, benefits, and responsibilities of the forces ' of one
party when serving in the territory of another party. It may therefore be expected that the Agreement will be an international obligation of this country
for some time to come. In claiming rights and privileges under the Agreement
for American troops stationed abroad, it would be a shrewd bargaining point
if the United States had already made such rights and privileges available to
NATO forces who are serving in the United States.'
The provisions of Article VII of the Agreement which authorize other
NATO countries to exercise criminal jurisdiction over American servicemen
stationed therein have received nationwide publicity and have been the subject
of intensive Congressional hearings. 8
In criticizing these provisions relating to criminal jurisdiction, Congressman
Frank T. Bow of Ohio stated, "These provisions abrogate the basic constitutional
rights of our American soldiers serving on foreign soil." '
On the other hand, Congressman Charles S. Gubser of California in vigorously supporting the Agreement said, "The material fact is that the rights of
American soldiers have been increased as a result of the Status of Forces
Treaty.."1
5Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Qualified Jurisdiciional Immunily, 31 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 364
(1954).
6 "Forces" is used in this thesis to include members of the forces and civilian component of a
sending State. Dependents are not included in this usage.
7 A recent listing of Department of the Army directives on the Agreement reveals that none
have been issued as to its operation in the U.S. (JAGW 1957/8493, 29 Oct. 1957).
8 Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 84th Cong.,

1st and 2d Sess. on H.J. Res. 309, Status of Forces Agreements (1955-1956) Pts. 1 and 2.
9Ibid.
1Old. at 137.
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While there has been marked controversy concerning the execution and the
wisdom, of the provisions of the Agreement relating to the trial, the sentencing
and the imprisonment of American Servicemen in foreign courts, there appears
to have been little thought to the fulfillment of the duties and obligations
imposed upon the United States in respect to the personnel of NATO countries
stationed in the United States.1
The experience of the United States with the actual operation of the Agreement among its forces abroad has indicated many problem areas. Accordingly,
it may be expected that the United States with the necessity of implementing
the Agreement between the 48 States and the Federal Government, as well as
with the sending State, will face even more complications.
The commission of a serious offense by a member of a NATO force could
develop into a cause celebre as a result of awkward handling by the authorities
of an unprepared Federal Government, or the equally unprepared authorities of
the several States. Such incidents might generate international ill feeling and
provoke hasty decisions, which upon subsequent analysis would prove to be
against the interests of the United States.
Article VII of the Agreement, dealing with criminal jurisdiction, Article
IV, relative to motor vehicle driving licenses, and Article X, pertaining to taxation, are likely to prove most troublesome and will affect substantially all NATO
personnel stationed in the United States. Accordingly, careful consideration of
the problems likely to arise under these Articles of the Agreement is warranted.
While the NATO SOF Agreement represents another example of the
curtailment of States Rights necessitated by the stepped up tempo of modern
international living, the full impact of these articles has not yet been felt by
the States. When the States become aware of this impairment of their sovereign
rights, it may be expected that the constitutionality of the Agreement will be
questioned.
In speculating as to the constitutionality of these Articles of the Agreement,
consider the following hypothetical situation which might arise under the provisions of Article VII in one of the 48 States:
A Turkish soldier, while in the performance of official duty in the United
States, commits an offense against State law and is apprehended by State authorities. The offense committed is also a violation of Turkish military law.
11 See Ibid, 271-72, where it is stated that although there are about 12,000 NATO troops stationed in the U.S. during the course of a year, no procedure has been established for reporting to
any central U.S. authority the trials of such personnel by State and Federal courts. This information had to be obtained from the various Embassies in the U.S.
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The State concerned is preparing to try the soldier and refuses to recognize as
binding the provisions of Article VII 12 of the Agreement, which provides that
in cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction and the offense arose out of an
act done in the performance of official duty, the military authorities of Turkey
have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. In justifying this action the State
asserts that the provisions of the Agreement, allowing Turkey the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over the soldier, are unconstitutional when applied
to one of the 48 States, arguing that the power of a State to punish offenders
of its criminal law is an attribute of Government and a necessary incident of
sovereignty. If a State can try a United States soldier, why can't it try a Turkish
soldier? While the Federal Government may curtail the exercise of its own
criminal jurisdiction by treaty, it has no constitutional right to make a treaty
which limits a power reserved to the States by the 10th Amendment.
The Supreme Court has not as yet considered the constitutionality of any
of the provisions of the NATO SOF Agreement. In the Girard case,"2 however, the Supreme Court construed the provisions of the Executive Agreement
with Japan," which is substantially similar to the NATO SOF Agreement.
The court held there was no constitutional barrier to carrying out the provisions
of the Agreement with Japan, which authorized the United States Government
to give up the qualified jurisdiction granted it by Japan over certain offenses
committed in Japan by members of the United States Armed Forces. The
Girard case was therefore limited to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
foreign courts over American forces stationed abroad. A similar limitation in
scope is found in the decisions of the lower federal courts 15 which have considered both the NATO SOF Agreement and the Executive Agreement with
Japan. In view of these limitations it will be necessary to go farther afield to
resolve the constitutional issue presented in the hypothetical stiuation.
As early as 1887, the Supreme Court in Wildenhus's Case 16 considered
such a treaty which limited the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the several
States. This treaty was between the United States and Belgium and gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Belgian consul over certain minor disorders committed
on a Belgian vessel by the crew thereof, even though such vessel was in the
territory of one of the States. Apparently unaware of any constitutional prob12

See Appendix.

13 Girard v. Wilson, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
14 Amendment of Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the
Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, T.I.A.S. 2848.
1 Cozart v. Wilson, 236 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1956), vacated as moot, 352 U.S. 884 (1956);
Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954); cert. denied. 348 U.S. 952 (1955).

16 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
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lem, other than the supremacy of the treaty, Chief Justice Waite stated for the
court,
"The treaty is part of the supreme law of the United States, and has the
same force and effect in New Jersey that it is entitled to elsewhere. If it gives

the consul of Belgium exclusive jurisdiction over the offense which it is alleged
has been committed within the territory of New Jersey, we see no reason why

he may not enforce his rights under the treaty by writ of habeas corpus in any
proper court of the United States."

17

Although New Jersey was held to have jurisdiction in the particular case,
it was because the offense committed was outside the scope of the treaty.
In 1920 in Missouri v. Holland 18 the sweeping language of the supremacy
clause of the Constitution was challenged on the grounds that it did not sanction
the invasion by the treaty-making power of certain reserved powers of the
States. The State of Missouri asserted that a treaty between the United States
and Great Britain for the protection of migratory birds, and an Act of Congress
passed pursuant thereto, which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to draw
up regulations to govern the hunting of such birds, were an unconstitutional
invasion of the police power of a State to protect the game within its boundaries.
On the basis of the supremacy of the treaty-making power, the Supreme Court
neatly disposed of the States Rights argument of Missouri. Both the treaty and
the statute were held to be constitutional.
New impetus was given to the supremacy of the Federal Government in
international affairs by the decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation.9 In this case Justice Sutherland forcefully stated:
"The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers

except those enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are
necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically
true only in respect of our internal affairs." 20 And again, "The powers to
declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic
relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution would have been vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality." 21
This opinion left little room for any contention that the powers reserved to
the states under Article X could not be restricted by a treaty.
7Id. at 17.
18 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

19 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
201d. at 315.

21 Id. at 318.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63

The unfettered status of the United States in foreign affairs was further
emphasized in United States v. Belmont " and United States v. Pink.23 In these
cases the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that in the field of international
affairs the national government cannot be subjected to any encroachment or
interference on the part of the several States.
Finally, in a case not even involving a treaty or other international agreement, the Supreme Court in Ullman v. United States 2"sustained, as constitutional, federal legislation which prohibited the States from prosecuting certain
offenses. In this case the court, in construing the Federal Immunity Act of 1954
as providing immunity from State as well as from federal prosecution, held
Congress has power to grant immunity from prosecution in a State court to a
witness compelled to testify in a case involving interference with the security
or defense of the United States by treason, espionage or other forms of subversion. This restraint of prosecutions by a State was upheld as "necessary
and proper" for safeguarding national security.
An examination of the preceding cases compels the conclusion that the
police powers of a State are neither sacred nor untouchable when weighed
against the supremacy of the treaty-making power or against the security of the
nation. In either case the individual State must yield, and there is little doubt
that the provisions of Article VII of the Agreement are a constitutional exercise
of the treaty power. Turkey, in the hypothetical situation, would therefore have
the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over the soldier. In the event the State
refused to surrender the soldier to Turkish military authorities, the federal
courts have jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus as to all persons restrained by State authority in violation of a treaty of the United States.25
THE ROLE OF THE SEVERAL STATES

Although the NATO SOF Agreement under the pattern of past Supreme
Court decisions would be constitutional, the peculiar wording of paragraph 2
of Article I 26 may prove troublesome in determining the role of the several
States in any implementation of the Agreement by the United States. This
paragraph applies the Agreement to the authorities of the political sub-divisions
of the Contracting Parties as it applies to the central authorities of the Contracting Parties.
22 301 U.S.
23315 U.S.
24350 U.S.
25 28 U.S.C.
26

324 (1937).
203 (1942).
422 (1956).
2241 c (3).

See Appendix.
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The following hypothetical situation indicates how this language of paragraph 2 might be utilized by one of the 48 States:
A British soldier while off duty steals clothing from a department store.
Under the provisions of Article VII the State concerned has the primary right
to exercise jurisdiction over the soldier. Because of disciplinary reasons the
military authorities of Great Britain feel this is a case of particular importance
and want to try the soldier by court-martial. Pursuant to paragraph 3 (c) of
Article VII they request the United States to waive its right to exercise primary
jurisdiction. Under the provisions of Article VII the United States is bound to
give sympathetic consideration to the request. The Federal authorities who
receive this request, advise the State that, in furtherance of national policy
to secure waivers from British authorities of their primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over similar offenses committed by American servicemen in Great
Britain, they have granted the British request for a waiver in this case. The
State, however, refuses to recognize the waiver by Federal authorities and prepares to try the British soldier. In support of this action, the State claims that
paragraph 2 of Article I applies the Agreement to the State as it applies to the
Federal Government. The State asserts that by virtue of this provision it possesses complete autonomy under the Agreement. Any request for waiver by
the British should have 'been made directly to the State. As long as the State
complied with the Agreement and gave the request sympathetic consideration, the Federal Government could not intervene if the State denied it. Further,
the State feels that as any such request for waiver is within its discretion, it is
not bound to follow the policy considerations of the Federal Government.
The hypothetical situation presents the provocative question of the validity
of the State's contention that under the Agreement it possesses complete autonomy. An inquiry into the Federal Constitution, its historical background and
its interpretation, as well as of the provisions of the Agreement, is necessary to
resolve this apparent impasse.
The Articles of Confederation, which preceded the Constitution, required
the approval of Congress for any "treaty, confederation or alliance" to which
a State should be a party.2 7 The Constitution, however, went further. It not
only laid down an unqualified prohibition against a State entering into any
"treaty, alliance or confederation", but additionally required the consent of
Congress for any "agreement or compact" by a State with a foreign power. 8
2

7 Art. VI.

28

Art. I, § 10, c. 3.
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In Holmes v. Jennison,2" Chief Justice Taney pointed out the significance of the
addition of these words. He stated as follows:
"As these words ('agreement or compact') could not have been idly or
superfluously used by the framers of the Constitution, they cannot be construed
to mean the same thing with the word treaty.

They evidently mean something

more, and were designed to make the prohibition more comprehensive..
The word 'agreement' does not necessarily import and direct any express stipulation; nor is it necessary that it should be in writing. If there is a verbal understanding, to which both parties have assented, and upon which both are acting,

it is an 'agreement'. And the use of all of these terms, 'treaty', 'agreement',
'compact', show that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
use the broadest and most comprehensive terms: and that they anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication between a State and a foreign
power; and we shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the
word 'agreement' its most extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit
every agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied,
by the mutual understanding of the parties." 30

There is no doubt that these provisions of the Constitution are a clear
expression of the original concept of its framers, that although the States were
several, their people in respect to foreign affairs were one. Rufus King at the
Framers' Convention, in respect to the entire absence of State power to deal
with foreign affairs, stated as follows:
"The States were not 'sovereigns' in the sense contended for by some.
They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty,-they could not make
war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties. Considering them as political beings,
they were dumb, for they could not speak to any foreign sovereign whatever.
They were deaf, for they could not hear any propositions from such sovereign." 31

At an early date in our history John Marshall viewed the Union as but one
entity in foreign affairs. On 7 March 1800 in the House of Representatives he
stated, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,
and its sole representative with foreign nations." 32
Perhaps, the most trenchant expression by the Supreme Court as to the
absence of international powers from the aggregate of State powers was con3
tained in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation."
In a learned
opinion, Justice Sutherland, reached the conclusion that, based on the inherent
14 Pet. 540 (1840).
sold. at 570, 571, 572.
31 5 Elliot's Debates 212.
32 Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613.
38 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
29
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power of the federal government to control foreign affairs, only the President
can speak or listen in such field as a representative of the nation.
The need for unity in international affairs was acknowledged by President
Eisenhower when on 27 April 1955 he stated, "The Constitution had as one of
its principal reasons for coming into being the conduct of the foreign affairs of
the United States as a single unit, not as 48 States." 34
The effect of the provisions of the Constitution has been, as between the
States and the Federal Government, to vest only in the Federal Government
the attributes of an International Person capable of responsible action in international affairs. In the eyes of other nations these constitutional limitations
have characterized the several States as political sub-divisions of the Federal
Government. The individual States have no standing in the community of
nations.
The position of the State in the hypothetical situation is therefore untenable.
Paragraph 2 of Article I cannot be interpolated to dub autonomy on the States
in international affairs. They could not be either a sending or receiving State
under the Agreement. As always, the interests of the several States in foreign
affairs are represented by the Federal Government.
The hypothetical situation is an example of the internecine conflict between
State and Federal Government that the framers of the Constitution sought to
avoid. The granting of the waiver is within the sole discretion of the Federal
Government and the State is therefore precluded from trying the British soldier.
Should the State refuse to release the soldier, federal courts by statute have
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus as to all persons restrained by State
authorities in violation of a treaty of the United States.8"
It is emphasized that in view of the broad language used by Chief Justice
6 as to what constitutes an agreement under clause
Taney in Holmes v. Jennison,"
3, section 10, Article I of the Constitution, the Federal Government should first
secure the consent of Congress before delegating to the States any authority to
make waiver agreements with foreign powers under Article VII of the Agreement. State action would otherwise constitute an agreement with a foreign
power requiring the consent of Congress.
It is not believed that the dicta in Virginia v. Tennessee,'7 that certain interstate compacts do not need the consent of Congress if they have no tendency
32 Dep't State Bull. 820 (1955).
3528 U.S.C. § 2241 c (3) (1952).
34

36

14 Pet. 540 (1840).

37 148 U. S. 503 (1893).
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to increase the political powers of the contractant States or to encroach upon the
just supremacy of the United States, can validly be applied to State agreements
with foreign powers. 8 Such reasoning barefacedly contradicts the express language of the Constitution which prescribes the approval of Congress to such
agreements. 9
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE

VII

In the United States it has been critically stated that the provisions of
Article VII are contrary to the principles of international law."0 There has been
strong reproach that the State Department has unnecessarily subjected American
servicemen to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. 4 It has been argued that under
international law friendly foreign troops are immune from the jurisdiction of
another nation wherein they are stationed with the consent of the host country.42
In a carefully written memorandum the Department of Justice has rebutted
these contentions with a penetrating examination of the position under international law of friendly foreign troops in a host country.4" The conclusions of
this memorandum were twofold: one, that when there is no express agreement
among nations, claims of immunity for friendly foreign troops for criminal
acts in the host State have generally been strongly rejected; and two, that the
United States by the Agreement acquired more jurisdiction over its forces abroad
than it had without it. Regardless of this controversy, the NATO SOF Agreement is an expression of positive international law. Whether it represents poor
bargaining or practical statesmanship on the part of the United States, its
obligations must be accepted.
Article VII is the heart of the Agreement. Its jurisdictional provisions
are an integral segment of the give and take scheme of national defense which
is the keystone of the United States foreign policy. In order for it to operate
effectively when the United States is a receiving State there must be amplification
on the municipal level. This amplification must be authoritative in source,
88 But see Dunbar, Interstate Compacts and Congressional Consent, 36 Va. L. Rev. 753 (1950),
and Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 500 (1918), who have resolved this dicta by stating that although local matters can be settled by interstate agreements without recourse to Congress, such agreements are avoidable at the option of Congress.
39 See Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A study in Interstate
Adjustments, 34 Yale L. J. 685, 694 (1924), as to the purpose of the compact clause.
40 See statement of Congressman Frank T. Bow of Ohio, op. cit., supra note 8, Pt. 1, 2, 3.
41 Ibid.
42 See King, JurisdictionOver Friendly Armed Forces, 36 Am. J. Int'l. L. 539 (1942)
and King,
Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 40 Am. J.
Int'l. L. 257 (1944).
4 Op. cit. supra note 8, Pt. 1, 139. See also Barton, Foreign Armed Forces; Immunity from
Supervisory Jurisdiction, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 380 (1949); Barton, Foreign Armed Forces; Im.
munity from Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 Brit. Y.B. Int'l. L. 186 (1950); Schwartz, InternationalLaw
and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1091 (1953),
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unequivocal as to meaning and far reaching in effect. It must state decisively
the responsibilities of the Federal Government under Article VII and the subordinate position of the 48 States. It should further furnish a framework for
machinery which will provide for the day to day operation of Article VII in the
United States and provide for the functioning of the service courts of a sending
State and for investigative and other assistance to the sending State.
The form of implementation which will best satisfy these requirements is
Congressional legislation. It would be far reaching, authoritative, and a forceful means of delimiting Federal and State relationships in the operation of the
Agreement in the United States.
In speaking of legislation which implemented a treaty provision of the
United States, the Supreme Court in Neely v. Henkel " stated:
"The power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying
into execution as well the powers enumerated in section 8 of article 1 of the
Constitution, as all other vested in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or the officers thereof, includes the power to enact such legislation as is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipulation which it is competent
for the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to insert in
a treaty with a foreign power." 45

In short, if Congress enacts legislation to carry the provisions of Article VII
into operation, the only question that could be raised as to the constitutionality
of such measures would be whether they are "necessary and proper" measures
for this purpose.
It is submitted that the type of implementing legislation suggested is not
only appropriate, but necessary and proper to give efficacy to the provisions
of Article VII in the United States and would therefore be constitutional.
In considering the provisions of such legislation it is not reasonable to
expect that Congress itself would have both the time and technique necessary
to prescribe all of the details necessary for the routine operation of Article VII
in the United States. Congress could however, formulate the general policies
to be followed and delegate to an administrative agency the task of promulgating the detailed rules and regulations necessary to effectuate the legislative
norms. The flexibility of this method is desirable, as the precise rule of action
to be followed in the United States may only be apparent after careful experimentation.
-44

45

180 U.S. 109 (1901),

Id. at 121.
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The federal agency most concerned with the operation of the criminal
provisions of Article VII in the United States is the Department of Justice, which
already has liaison with its counterpart among the States and would therefore
be capable of supervising the administration of the provisions of Article VII in
consonance with the lines established by Congress. In this respect Congress
should provide that such regulations as may be adopted by The AttorneyGeneral should not become effective until approved by the President.
It should be noted that the implementation of Article VII in the United
States will encompass both State and Federal offenses and in those cases where
the offense is solely a violation of State law, the States should have the widest
possible discretion consistent with the furtherance of the foreign policy of the
United States.
For the purpose of determining a solution to some of the troublesome
problems that might be encountered in formulating implementing legislation
Article VII should be divided as follows: 1. Exclusive Jurisdiction. 2. Concurrent Jurisdiction. 3. State and Federal Jurisdiction over the Same Act. 4.
Service Courts of the Sending State, and 5. Other Assistance to the Sending
State.
1. Exclusive jurisdiction
The second paragraph of Article VII "' concisely sets forth the right of the
sending and receiving States to exercise exclusive jurisdiction. It grants the military authorities of the sending State the right to exercise jurisdiction in the United
States over persons subject to its military law as to offenses, including security
offenses, punishable by the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the
receiving State. It permits the United States the right to exercise jurisdiction
over members of a force or civilian component of a -sending State and their
dependents with respect to offenses, including security offenses, punishable by
the law of the United States, but not by the law of the sending State.
In determining whether the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over a
particular offense committed by a member of a force of a sending State a knowledge of the military code of the sending State is an essential working tool.
Consider the following hypothetical situation which might arise in the
United States under this provision:
A French soldier commits an offense in violation of United States law
over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction. The soldier is in the
custody of the United States authorities. As part of his duties with the French
46 See Appendix,
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Army the soldier handles classified information vital to the security of France.
The French authorities fear that if the soldier is confined in a civil jail the
security information possessed by the soldier might be compromised. In order
to regain full control over the soldier and with knowledge that they cannot try
him for the offense committed, the French authorities request the United States
to waive its right to exercise jurisdiction. The authorities of the United States do
not realize that the offense is not an offense under French law. In the belief
that the French military authorities have jurisdiction and will try the soldier,
the United States authorities on this condition waive the right of the United
States to exercise jurisdiction. After delivering the soldier to the French authorities, the United States realizes that the French authorities cannot try the
soldier. Can the United States now regain jurisdiction?
The type of waiver in the hypothetical situation must not be confused with
the waiver of the right to exercise primary jurisdiction set out in paragraph 3 (c)
of Article VII."7 In the hypothetical situation the French authorities are asking
the United States not to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction. The misunderstanding
arose when the United States thought the French authorities were going to try
the soldier.
The United States could probably regain jurisdiction, although the administrative difficulties might make such action infeasible. In the hypothetical situation the United States conditioned its waiver upon the event that the French
authorities try the soldier. Since France could not try the soldier because it
lacked any jurisdiction over the offense, the waiver of the United States never
reached maturity. Conversely, if the United States had made the waiver, fully
realizing that the French authorities could not exercise jurisdiction over the
soldier for the offense committed, it would patently be an act of bad faith for
the United States to attempt to regain jurisdiction.
Recently, the French Court of Cassation on an appeal, which considered
whether a previous waiver of criminal jurisdiction by French authorities was a
bar to the combined civil-criminal action brought on behalf of the widow of a
Canadian officer killed while riding in the car of an American Air Force officer,
held that the waiver was binding on all agencies of France, including the courts."8
This case involved an unconditional waiver and must be distinguished from
the conditional waiver in the hypothetical case. It should be noted that Article
VII has no requirement that a request for a waiver of exclusive jurisdiction be
47
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even considered. Such action would be strictly a matter of comity between the
nations concerned.
Seemingly, a knowledge of the law of the sending State will eliminate any
difficulty in implementing this provision in the United States. It would suffice
if legislation were enacted setting forth the substance of Article VII dealing
with this provision and authorizing The Attorney-General to formulate necessary administrative procedures. Except for the foregoing, the several States
should have full rein in those cases where they'exercise exclusive jurisdiction.
2.

Concurrent jurisdiction

In those cases where concurrent jurisdiction exists between the sending and
the receiving States, paragraph 3 of Article VII provides which party shall have
the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. It also establishes a procedure for the
other party to request a waiver of such primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
When concurrent jurisdiction exists under Article VII the military authorities of a sending State in the United States would have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in
relation to:
(1) Offenses solely against the property or security of the sending State.
(2) Offenses solely against the person or property of another member of
the force or civilian component of the sending State or a dependent of such
member.
(3) Offenses arising out of an act or omission done in the performance of
official duty.
The United States would have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction in
the case of all other offenses. It would always have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over dependents as they are not included in this provision.
The offenses set out in (1) and (2), offenses against the sending State,
are so clearly defined that there should be little difficulty in deciding when the
sending State has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
But the antithesis of this is found in relation to (3), offenses arising out
of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty. What constitutes such an offense? Consider the following hypothetical situation which
might arise in the United States in regard to this determination:
A soldier from a sending State while on guard duty at a cantonment in
New York State gets drunk and carelessly discharges his firearm, killing an
American. The sending State asserts that it has the primary right to exercise
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jurisdiction over the soldier as the offense arose from an act done during the
performance of official duty. The United States takes the position that the circumstances of drunkenness and careless discharge of a firearm negate any conclusion that the offense arose out of an act or omission done in the performance
of official duty. Therefore, the United States claims that it has the primary right
to exercise jurisdiction over the soldier and that he may be tried by the State of
New York.
In an attempt to secure jurisdiction over its forces in as many cases as
possible, sending States have a tendency to maintain that any offense committed
during the period of performance of official duty, regardless of its relationship
to the duty, entitles it to the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. In several
cases the United States as a sending State was successful in urging that an offense
arising out of the driving of a motor vehicle from home to place of duty was an
offense arising out of an act done in the performance of official duty.4"
At any rate, a sending State in support of this liberal view could argue that
it is merely interpreting Article VII in accordance with the opinion expressed by
Oppenheim 5 that if an accused member of a visiting force was on duty at that
time when he transgressed local law, he was entitled to immunity from prosecution for the offense by the host State. But this argument must yield to the
express language of paragraph 3 (a) (ii) of Article VII, which limits such
offenses to those committed in the course of the performance of official duty.
It clearly requires something more than that the offense was committed during
the period while the accused was on official duty. This additional ingredient is
a casual connection between the offense committed and an act or ommission
done in the performance of official duty.
Returning to the hypothetical situation, as there is no casual relationship
between the offense and any act or omission in the performance of official duty,
the sending State would not have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. But,
there is no doubt that there will be substantial dispute as to whether an offense
falls within the official duty provision. The situation will be further aggravated
when the factual basis of an offense is in doubt; one view of the facts supporting
an offense committed in the course of official duty, the other view establishing
the absence of a casual relationship between the offense and an act done in the
course of official duty. "1 These factual conflicts are not susceptible to cure by
49 Snee and Pye, A Report on the Actual Operation of Article VII of the Status of Forces Agreement, p. 44, Georgetown University Law Center (1956).
50 1 Oppenheim, International Law 759 (7th Ed., Lauterpacht, 1947).
51 Such a controverted factual dispute was revealed in Girard v. Wilson, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
One version of the facts indicated Girard fired at the deceased as an incident to his duties as a
guard; the other version indicated that he was on a frolic of his own and there was no connection
between the unlawful act and his duties.
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any general rule. Concurrent and cooperative investigation by the authorities
of the sending and receiving States in ascertaining the facts would, however,
reduce such incidents to a minimum.
The countries of France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Turkey 52 have
in general recognized that the sending State has the right to make the initial
determination as to whether it has the right to exercise primary jurisdiction.
It further appears that this view was advanced in the working papers of the
Agreement by the American Representative, " accepted by the Working Group, 4
and has also been the position of the United States as a sending State.15 Accordingly the United States as a receiving State should follow this trend.
In France an administrative procedure has been developed to expedite the
recognition of this primary right of the sending State in appropriate cases. 5
Under this procedure the sending State informs the French procureur of the
nature of the incident in which the member of the force is involved and over
which concurrent jurisdiction exists, the sending State then asserts that under
the circumstances it has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph 3 of Article VII, and states that unless a reply is received in ten days
it will proceed to dispose of the case. If the French disagree with the determination of the sending State and lodge an objection, the matter is negotiated.
A similar procedure would work effectively in the United States and should
be included in the administrative regulations promulgated by The AttorneyGeneral. It should be applied to all offenses, State and Federal, where concurrent jurisdiction with the sending State exists.
Article VII does not provide for the impasse which results when the sending
State and the United States cannot agree as to who possesses the primary right
to proceed. One workable solution would ,be for the United States and the
sending State to agree that all such cases would be submitted to an arbitrator
whose adjudication would be binding and conclusive on both parties.
Although the sending State has no right under the Agreement to claim
primary jurisdiction over dependents, the practice has been otherwise. In
France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Turkey foreign authorities have not
claimed, nor have American authorities on behalf of the United States as a
sending State admitted, any distinction between dependents and a member of
Snee and Pye, supra note 49, at 22, 23, 24.
3Summary Record, Doc. MS-R (51) 14, 26 April 1951.
54 Summary Record, Doc. MS (J) R (51) 5, 21 Feb. 1951.
55 Snee and Pye, supra note 49, at 22, 23, 24.
- Id. at 22.
52

5
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a force in this regard."1 Accordingly, as a matter of comity, if not of law,
implementing legislation in the United States should include dependents among
those over whom the sending State could claim the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction. In fact, it would not be amiss to extend the definition of dependents as set out in paragraph 1 of Article I to include any other person wholly
or mainly maintained by the member of a force or civilian component of a
sending State. This has already been done in the United Kingdom. 8 Such
liberalizing action on the part of the United States would be worthwhile in
prompting similar action by the other NATO countries and thus benefiting
United States dependents abroad.
Under Article VII it is possible that one act could constitute an offense
over which the sending State would have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction and also an offense over which the United States would have a similar right.
Such a situation could arise where a member of a force through reckless driving
kills another member of the force. The sending State would have the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over the homicide since the victim was a member
of the force of the sending State. Conversely, the United States would have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction over the reckless driving offense. This
type of situation will ordinarily be resolved through negotiation. Usually the
State having the primary jurisdiction over the more serious offense should be
allowed to proceed by the other State. The Attorney-General under the implementing legislation should have sufficient authority to resolve such problems.
As no general standard can be set forth for the exercise of this authority, each
case would have to be decided with a view to the best interest of the United
States.
In those cases where the several States would have the right to exercise
primary jurisdiction over a member of a force and the country concerned has
not requested a waiver of the State's right to proceed, the State should be afforded full discretion in disposing of the case unfettered by Federal legislation.
Where the primary right to exercise jurisdiction is in the sending State, the
implementing legislation should clearly set forth that neither State nor Federal
courts may exercise jurisdiction until the sending State has waived its right to
exercise its primary jurisdiction. The Attorney-General should have authority
to draft regulations carrying out these provisions.
When concurrent jurisdiction exists, paragraph 3 (c) of Article VII provides that the State having the primary right to proceed must give sympathetic
consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver
57 Snee and Pye, supra note 49, at 43
58 Visiting Forces Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, (c. 67), s. 12 (4).
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of its primary right to exercise jurisdiction. This request would be made by
the other State in cases it considers to be of particular importance. While there
is no obligation on the part of the State receiving such a request to grant it,
there does appear to be a duty to refrain from trying any case until its authorities
have completed action on the request for waiver. Otherwise, the right of the
State requesting the waiver would be meaningless.
The sole substantitive problem facing the United States as a receiving
State under this provision will be the formulation of the policy it will follow
in granting and denying such requests for waiver of State and Federal primary
jurisdiction from the sending State. Inevitably, the policy adopted will have an
impact on the operation of the United States as a sending State in securing
similar waivers from foreign jurisdictions in behalf of American servicemen
abroad. Therefore, in order to gauge the action of the United States as a receiving State on such requests, its objectives as a sending State should be examined.
As a sending State the United States has taken full advantage of this
provision of Article VII. Whenever possible United States commanders in the
field have sought waivers of the primary right of a foreign country to exercise
jurisdiction over American servicemen. 59 The fecundity of this policy was revealed by the fact that during the period from 1.December 1954 through 31 May
1955 foreign countries waived their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in
2,952 out of 4,458 cases involving persons subject to United States military law,
or in 66.2% of the cases."° A further consideration is that the number of
American troops abroad is disproportionately larger than the approximately
12,000 foreign troops stationed in the United States during the course of a year. "1
It is therefore evident that a liberal policy by the United States as a receiving
State in granting requests for waiver of its primary right to exercise jurisdiction
would best encourage like waivers from foreign countries for American servicemen who transgress foreign law. As a means of attaining this objective, the
policy of the United States might well consist in granting all requests by a
sending State for a waiver of the primary right of the United States to exercise
jurisdiction, except in unusual cases. The citing of this procedure for foreign
troops in the United States would be a potent lever in obtaining similar treatment for American forces abroad.
Legislation carrying out this policy should provide The Attorney-General
with authority to grant the requests of a sending State for a waiver of the
59 Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, op. cit. supra
note 8, Pt. 1, 172, 173.
60 Id. at 176.
61 Id. at 271.
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primary right of the United States to exercise jurisdiction over offenses in violation of either State or Federal law. It is essential that this legislation clearly
provide that the several States may not take action on any requests for waiver
from a sending State, and that they may not take action on such a case until
action on the waiver request has been completed by proper Federal authorities.
This limitation on the sovereignty of the several States is necessary as a means
of carrying out the overall foreign policy of the nation in regard to obtaining
similar waivers for United States forces abroad. In forwarding such requests
by the sending State to The Attorney-General for action, the States should attach
their recommendations as to whether or not the waiver should be granted.
To avoid administrative ensnarlment The Attorney-General should establish the channels -by which Federal and State authorities should forward these
requests and should also provide a means by which the Commanding Officer of
the accused member of a force may be immediately notified of his apprehension
by State or Federal authorities. The importance of this notification cannot be
overemphasized. It is a duty imposed on the receiving State by paragraph 5 (b)
of Article VII. Failure to notify the military superiors of the accused may in
some cases deprive the sending State of its right to request a waiver, and may
cause much resentment and ill-will. In establishing a prompt reporting system
it will be necessary to study the command structure of the various NATO forces
in the United States. In some cases it may be necessary to go through, diplomatic
channels or through United States forces to give such notice. Again, action on
the case should be delayed until appropriate notice has been given.
3. State and Federal jurisdiction Over the Same Act
In the United States there exists a limited number of situations where the
same act is an offense against both State and Federal law. Unless otherwise
agreed, the customary procedure in these cases is for the jurisdiction first taking
cognizance of the matter to retain it to a conclusion, to the exclusion of the
other.6" The legislation implementing Article VII should provide for this contingency. It would suffice if it simply provided that unless otherwise agreed
between the State and Federal Government the general rule as set forth above
would apply. While this general rule would entitle either the State or Federal
Government to proceed in a case of concurrent jurisdiction over a member of
the force of a sending State, what would be the result if the other jurisdiction
attempted to try the member for the same offense after the completion of the
first trial ? This aspect is explored in the following hypothetical situation:
62
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In a Federal court a soldier of a sending State is tried and acquitted of an
offense against Federal law. The Judge in the case publicly called the verdict
of the jury disgraceful. Since the act for which the soldier was tried is also an
offense against State law, federal authorities bring the evidence in the case to
State prosecutors. The soldier is indicted, tried and convicted in the State court.
The authorities of the sending State protest that this is double jeopardy and a
violation of paragraph 8 of Article VII.
The procedure is apparently correct.63 It is not prohibited by the Federal
Constitution nor by any provision of the Agreement. Paragraph 8 of Article
VII only provides that where an accused has been tried by the authorities of one
contracting party under the Agreement and has been acquitted by that contracting party or has been convicted and is serving or has served his sentence or has
been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offense within the same
territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party. Since the State authorities in the hypothetical situation are not another Contracting Party, but
part of the United States, the Agreement does not preclude the second trial.
As a practical matter the United States should include in the legislation
implementing Article VII a prohibition against duplicate trial by State and
Federal courts for the same offense, particularly since it has been argued that
the procedure in civil law countries, such as France and Italy, where the prosecutor has a right to appeal from an acquittal, is a violation of an American
serviceman's Constitutional rights. Under its law the United States can go one
step more. If it loses out in the Federal court, it can, if jurisdiction is concurrent,
try again in a State court. Even the much libeled civil law countries prohibit
this procedure.
4.

Service Courts of a Sending State

The provisions of paragraph 1 (a) of Article VII establishes the right of
the military authorities of the sending State to convene service courts of appropriate jurisdiction within the United States. This would include the right of the
sending State to convene any military, naval or air force court or other similar
tribunal of the sending State to exercise in the United States the criminal and
disciplinary jurisdiction of the sending State.
Although Article VII provides that a service court of a sending State may
function in the United States, such courts may need certain assistance from the
63 See Bartkus v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 281 (1958) where under a similar factual situation the
judgment of the State court was affirmed by an equally divided court. This involved due process
under the 14th Amendment. See also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) re the constitutionality of a second trial by Federal court after a former trial by State court for the same act.
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United States to effectively exercise their jurisdiction, as when American witnesses are required by a foreign service court.
At present there is no authority under which the United States could compel
the recalcitrant witnesses to testify, even though paragraph 6 (a) of Article
VII requires the United States to assist the sending State "in the collection and
production of evidence". The Working Papers of the Agreement indicate that
the words "and production" were inserted for the purpose of making the attendance of civilian witnesses of the receiving State compulsory."' Be this as it may,
in practice this interpretation has not been adopted. The only NATO countries
who have provided compulsory process for such witnesses before a service court
of a sending State have been the United Kingdom " and Canada. " Notwithstanding that there may be disunity among the NATO countries on this matter,
the intent reflected in the Working Papers of the Agreement and the practical
consideration, that in certain cases the lack of this power would emasculate the
service courts of a sending State, are compelling reasons for providing the sending State with a means of obtaining the attendance of American witnesses.
Such a step by the United States would aid it as a sending State in securing
similar privileges abroad.
The most effective way to provide this assistance in the United States would
be by legislation, providing appropriate Federal courts with jurisdiction to issue
orders to persons within their jurisdiction to appear before the service courts of
the sending State, with fees and mileage to be paid by the sending State. It
should provide for contempt and perjury proceedings against these witnesses.
It is essential that this legislation entitle these witnesses before the service courts
of the sending State to the same immunities and privileges enjoyed by witnesses
before a United States federal court. This would insure that American nationals
would have such Constitutional safeguards as the protection against self-incrimination.
The Friendly Services Courts Act of 1944, which is presently inoperative,
provides a format which would be a useful guide in drafting this legislation. "7
5. Other Assistance to the Sending State
The provisions of paragraph 5 (a), 6 (a) and 7 (b) of Article VII respectively bind the United States to assist the sending State in making arrests, to
assist the sending State in carrying out investigations, to assist the sending State
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in the collection and production of evidence and to give sympathetic consideration to any request from the sending State for assistance in carrying out a
sentence of imprisonment.
This provision that the United States will assist the sending State in the
arrest of a member of its force or their dependents should apply to State as well
as Federal authorities. This construction is based on paragraph 2 of Article I,
which applies the Agreement to State authorities, and on the Working Papers
of the Agreement, which in relation to this provision of the Agreement state
that the term "authorities" applies not only to the authorities of the central
government, but also to local and military authorities.6 8
In applying the arrest provision of the Agreement to the United States,
the situation where a member of the force of a sending State commits an offense
in violation of Federal or State law, and that where such a member commits
an offense over which the sending State has exclusive jurisdiction, must be distinguished. In the first situation, Federal or State police authorities need no
additional powers to arrest; their normal police powers would be sufficient. In
the second situation, special authority to arrest would be necessary, since there
is no violation of State or Federal law.
Accordingly, legislation implementing this provision of the Agreement
must confer jurisdiction on United States arresting authorities to make arrests
for those offenses over which the sending State has exclusive jurisdiction. For
example, such legislation could provide that upon request of an officer commanding any force of a sending State, any person (in the civil, military or naval
establishments of the United States, or in the civil establishment of a State)
having authority to arrest, could summarily arrest any member of a force or
civilian component of the sending State (or dependent thereof) so designated in
the request and deliver him to the custody of an officer of the sending State.
It is not considered advisable that any special provision be made to protect such
arresting officers against suits for damages as the result of the arrest of a foreign
serviceman pursuant to this legislation. Such a provision would 'be repugnant
to public policy in exculpating their excesses.
Similar legislation should provide authority for State and Federal law
enforcement agencies to assist the sending State in carrying out investigations
and in the collection and production of evidence. The Attorney-General should
be empowered to adopt appropriate implementing regulations for these provisions. Additionally, Congress should provide that persons sentenced to imprisonment by a service court of a sending State in the United States may be
68
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confined in a disciplinary barracks, guardhouse or other place of detention of
the United States armed forces or in other confinement facilities of the United
States at the expense of the sending State. Such legislation would aid a sending
State in carrying out sentences imposed by its service court.
It is concluded that the implementation of the provisions of Article VII
within the United States by a combination of Federal legislation and federal
administrative regulations is the only effective method for this country to discharge its obligations and duties as a receiving State under the NATO SOF
Agreement. The procedures outlined restrict the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by one of the 49 States only in those cases where the sending State has
requested a waiver of the right of the United States to exercise jurisdiction. In
these cases the Federal Government would have the authority to grant the waiver
even though the offense concerned was solely a violation of State law. It is not
considered that this minimum control on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
a State is an unwarranted invasion of the sovereignty of the several States. It
is justified on the basis of advancing the overall foreign policy of the United
States and thus securing the maximum benefits for American forces and their
dependents stationed in the other NATO countries.
These procedures are aimed at securing uniformity in the day to day operation of the Agreement throughout the United States. Should they not be followed or should the Supreme Court for some unforseen reason find them to be
in violation of the Constitution, no other acceptable substitute is available. In
fact, if the Federal Government does not unequivocally control the implementation of Article VII in the United States, it will become a multiple source of
tripartite conflict among the sending State, the Federal Government and the
several States.
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLES IV AND X

Article IV, dealing with motor vehicle driving licenses, and Article X,
dealing with taxation, concern what may be termed non-competing aspects of
sovereignty, since they contain no provision that the sending State must forego
the exercise of its own sovereignty in regard to driving licenses and taxation
because of any act by the receiving State under such Articles. The sovereignties
involved are therefore non-competing. In cases where concurrent jurisdiction
exists the sending and receiving States vie with each other for the primary right
to exercise jurisdiction. In practice the loser is usually precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the individual concerned for the offenses committed.
The absence of this competing aspect of sovereignty in Articles IV and X
simplifies their implementation. Further, since the receiving State is exercising
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territorial sovereignty, which is not in conflict with the personal sovereignty of
the sending State, and the Articles themselves require no notification to the
sending State, the receiving State in practice will be able to deal directly with
the member of the sending State.
Article IV
Article IV provides that the United States as a receiving State is obligated
either (1) to accept as valid the driving permit or license or military driving
permit of the sending State or (2) to issue its own license without a driving test
to a member of the force or civilian component of the sending State who holds
a valid driver's license or permit or military driving permit issued by the sending
State. Dependents are not included in the provisions of this Article. No difficulty has been encountered in securing this privilege for American servicemen
stationed in the other NATO countries.
The provisions of this Article apply only to driving licenses for motor
vehicles operated 'by the force of the sending State in a private capacity.' It is
therefore inapplicable to assigned operators of the service vehicles of the sending
State while being used on official business.
In the United States the issuance of civilian driving licenses, except for the
District of Columbia, is solely a function of the several States. As Article IV
applies to the States, they are bound to comply with its provisions. In view of
this, consider the following hypothetical situation:
A French soldier on duty in the State of North Carolina is apprehended
by the North Carolina State Police for the offense of driving his civilian motor
vehicle without having a North Carolina driving license. In his defense the
French soldier maintains that under the provisions of Article IV of the Agreement, North Carolina must either accept his French driving license as valid or
issue him a driving license without a test. Further, since North Carolina has
not made any provision for issuing driver's licenses to members of a NATO
force, the soldier asserts that North Carolina must now recognize his French
driving license.
The position taken by the soldier is consistent with Article IV. In order
for North Carolina to prosecute the soldier for lack of a North Carolina license
it must first establish a requirement for such a license pursuant to Article IV.
Then if the soldier does not comply, even though he has a valid French license,
he may be tried in the North Carolina courts.
The hypothetical situation demonstrates that implementation of Article IV
in the United States requires a means whereby the Federal Government, which
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is responsible to the sending State for discharging the obligations imposed by
this Article, can insure compliance by the States. How may this be accomplished
without unduly infringing upon the sovereignty of the several States?
The provisions of this Article are so simple that little in the way of implementation is needed. The major difficulty will be in bringing it to the attention
of State authorities so that they will recognize its application to NATO forces
in the United States. This could easily be accomplished by Federal legislation
which provided that in the absence of a State established procedure for the
issuance of State driving licenses to a member of a NATO force or civilian
component under the circumstances specified in Article IV, the driving permit
or license or military driving permit of the sending State will be valid in such
State. The several States could then either issue their own licenses or be forced
to recognize that of the sending State. Such legislation would be constitutional
on the basis of being necessary and proper to carry into operation the provisions
pertaining to Article IV. Actually, although this legislation paraphrases the
Article, it has the virtue of promulgating its provisions throughout the nation
in a form having force and authority and readily available to State officials.
As an alternative to such legislation, a less effective procedure would be
for the Secretary of State to request the assistance of the Council of State
Governments. This organization could endeavor to insure that each State either
recognized the driving license of the sending State or issued its own without
requiring a driver's test as provided in Article IV.
Article X
It has been argued that in practice there should be no taxation by a host
nation of friendly foreign troops stationed in the host country with its permission." This view is predicated on the theory that the consent of the host country
to the entry of the friendly foreign troops implies a waiver of its sovereignty
over such forces. Taxation of such troops is an exercise of sovereignty by the
host country and should therefore be precluded.
Regardless of the soundness of this argument, practical reasons dictate
the exemption of friendly foreign forces from certain forms of taxation by the
host country. Traditionally it has been recognized that the power to tax inherently includes the power to destroy by excessive taxation. Collection of income
tax, for example, from friendly foreign forces might well prevent such troops
from performing the duties for which they were permitted to enter the host
69 Fairman and King, Taxation of Friendly Armed Forces, 38 Am. J. Int'l. L. 258 (1944).
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country. It is also repugnant that one ally should seek to enrich itself by the
taxation of another ally's forces.
At any rate Article X adequately protects the members of a force or civilian
component of a sending State from this type of tyranny by taxation. It provides
that where the legal incidence of any form of taxation in the receiving State
depends upon residence or domicile, periods during which a member of a force
or civilian component of a sending State is in the territory of that State by reason
solely of his being a member of such force or civilian component shall not be
considered as periods of residence or domicile for the purpose of such taxation.
Further, it states that such members when stationed in the receiving State are
exempt from income tax by the receiving State on salary and emoluments paid
to them as members of the sending State. Such members are also exempted
from taxation on any tangible moveable property the presence of which is in
the receiving State due solely to the temporary presence of the members. On the
debit side, Article X provides those forms of taxation of members of the sending
State which are authorized by the receiving State. Thus such members may be
taxed by the receiving State with respect to any profitable enterprise other than
their employment as a member of the sending State. Dependents are not included in this Article.
The basic concept behind Article X as stated in the Working Papers of the
Agreement was to devise a system of taxation that would insure, first, that a
member of a foreign force would not suffer a financial loss on account of service
in a receiving State and, second, that such a member would not profit by undue
70
advantages which would give the impression of enjoying fiscal privileges.
In the United States the implementation of Article X into the tax structure
of both the Federal and State Governments is necessary.
In the sphere of federal taxation little difficulty is foreseen. Section 894
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code already provides that income exempted by
any treaty obligation of the United States is exempt from taxation under that
subtitle. 7' Thus as to the federal system of taxation, no additional legislation
is needed.
Each State, however, must take action to include the provisions of Article
X in their tax structure. While it is not expected that the States would fail to
become acquainted with these tax provisions, it would not be amiss for the
Federal Government to enact legislation applying the provisions of Article X
to the States. Such legislation would simply restrict the States from taxing
70
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members of a force of a sending State
would be tangible authority for any
State tax in contravention of Article
quainted with Article X, there should

as set out in the Article. This legislation
member of a NATO force protesting a
X. In practice, once the States are acbe no problems in this area.

CONCLUSIONS

It has been demonstrated that the Federal Government has failed to discharge the obligations imposed on the United States as a receiving State by
Articles IV, VII and X of the NATO SOF Agreement. By demanding abroad
certain rights under the Agreement for American servicemen, while neglecting
these same rights for foreign NATO forces in the United States, this country
has become a target for the unpleasant charge of discrimination. Further, other
NATO nations may justifiably be reluctant to grant concessions to American
servicemen in matters relating to the Agreement because they would be unilateral
in nature in view of the negative position taken by the United States as a receiving State.
In juxtaposition with the need to fulfill our international obligations under
the Agreement, is the equally important requirement that authorities of the
Federal Government, the several States and the sending State have guidance as
to how the provisions of Article IV, VII and X will operate in the United States.
In view of these international and domestic considerations, the fact that to-date
few cases have arisen in the United States under the Agreement is not a valid
reason for rejecting its implementation in the United States.
Federal legislation is necessary and proper to carry into operation the provisions of the Agreement in the United States. Coupled with administrative
regulation, this approach would insure that the obligations of the United
States set out in Article VII would be uniformly fulfilled throughout the
country, and would afford the United States sufficient scope to advance its
foreign policy under the Agreement by paralleling its domestic implementation of the Agreement to such policy, thus benefiting American servicemen
abroad.
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Appendix
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY REGARDING
THE STATUS OF THEIR FORCES

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4th April, 1949,
Considering that the forces of one Party may be sent, by arrangement, to serve in the
territory of another Party:
Bearing in mind that the decision to send them and the conditions under which they
will be sent, in so far as such conditions are not laid down by the present Agreement,
they will continue to be the subject of separate Agreements between the parties concerned;
Desiring, however, to define the status of such forces while in the territory of
another Party;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I

1. In this Agreement the expression(a) "force" means the personnel belonging to the land, sea or air armed services of
one Contracting Party when in the territory of another Contracting Party in the North
Atlantic Treaty area in connection with their official duties, provided that the two Contracting Parties concerned may agree that certain individuals, units or formations shall
not be regarded as constituting or included in a "force" for the purpose of the present
Agreement;
(b) "civilian component" means the civilian personnel accompanying a force of
a Contracting Party who are in the employ of an armed service of that Contracting Party,
and who are not stateless persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a Party to the
North Atlantic Treaty, nor nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in, the State in which
the force is located;
(c) "dependent" means the spouse of a member of a force or of a civilian component, or a child of such member depending on him or her for support;
(d) "sending State" means the Contracting Party to which the force belongs;
(e) "receiving State" means the Contracting Party in the territory of which the force
or civilian component is located, whether it be stationed there or passing in transit;
(f) "military authorities of the sending State" means those authorities of a sending
State who are empowered by its law to enforce the military law of that State with respect
to members of its forces or civilian components;
(g) "North Atlantic Council" means the council established by Article 9 of the
North Atlantic Treaty or any of its subsidiary bodies authorized to act on its behalf.
2. This Agreement shall apply to the authorities of political sub-divisions of the
Contracting Parties, within their territories to which the Agreement applied or extends
in accordance with Article XX, as it applies to the central authorities of those Contracting Parties, provided, however, that property owned by political sub-divisions shall not be
considered to be property owned by a Contracting Party within the meaning of Article
VIII.
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ARTICLE IV

The receiving State shall either
(a) accept as valid, without a driving test or fee, the driving permit or license or
military driving permit issued by the sending State or sub-division thereof to a member
of a force or of a civilian component; or
(b) issue its own driving permit or license to any member of a force or civilian
component who holds a driving permit or license or military driving permit issued by the
sending State or a sub-division thereof, provided that no driving test shall be required.

ARTICLE VII

1. Subject to the provisions of this Article,
(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the
law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of that State;
(b) the authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the members
of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offenses committed
within the territory of the receiving State and punishable by the law of that State.
2. (a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect
to offenses, including offenses relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending
State, but not by the law of the receiving State.

(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force .or civilian component and their dependents
with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of that State, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending State.
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a security offense against a State shall include
(i) treason against the State;
(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets
of that State, or secrets relating to the national defense of that State.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules
shall apply:
'I;
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in relation to
(i) offenses solely against the property or security of that State, or offenses
solely against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component of that State or of a dependent;
(ii) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance
of official duty.
2
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(b) In the case of any other offense the authorities of the receiving State shall have
the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it
shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of
the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request
from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other
State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.
4. The foregoing provisions of this Article shall not imply any right for the military
authorities of the sending State to exercise jurisdiction over persons who are nationals
of or ordinarily resident in the receiving State, unless they are members of the force of
the sending State.
5.-(a) The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each other
in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component or their dependents in the
territory of the receiving State and in handing them over to the authority which is to
exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall notify promptly the military
authorities of the sending State of the arrest of any member of a force or civilian component or a dependent.
(c) The custody of an accused member of a force or civilian component over
whom the receiving State is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the
sending State, remain with that State until he is charged by the receiving State.
6.-(a) The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each other
in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses, and in the collection and
production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of
objects connected with an offense. The handing over of such objects may, however, be
made subject to their return within the time -specified by the authority delivering them.
(b) The authorities of the Contracting Parties shall notify one another of the
disposition of all cases in which there are concurrent rights to exercise jurisdiction.
7.-(a) A death sentence shall not be carried out in the receiving State by the
authorities of the sending State if the legislation of the receiving State does not provide
for such punishment in a similar case.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall give sympathetic consideration
to a request from the authorities of the sending State for assistance in carrying out a
sentence of imprisonment pronounced by the authorities of the sending State under the
provision of this Article within the territory of the receiving State.
8. Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this
Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party and has been acquitted, or has been
convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not
be tried again for the same offense within the same territory by the authorities of another
Contracting Party. However, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the sending State from trying a member of its force for any violation of rules
of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an offense for which he
was tried by the authorities of another Contracting Party.
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9. Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made
against him;
(c) to be confronted with witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are
within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defence or to have free
or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in
the receiving State;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending
State and, when the rules of court permit, to have such a representative present at his trial.
10.-(a) Regularly constituted military units or formations of a force shall have
the right to police any camps, establishments or other premises which they occupy as the
result of an agreement with the receiving State. The military police of the force may
take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security on such
premises;
(b) Outside these premises, such military police shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the authorities of the receiving State and in liaison with these
authorities, and in so far as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order
among the members of the force.
11. Each Contracting Party shall seek such legislation as it deems necessary to ensure the adequate security and protection within its territory or installations, equipment,
property, records and official information of other Contracting Parties, and the punishment of persons who may contravene laws enacted for that purpose.

ARTICLE X

1. Where the legal incidence of any form of taxation in the receiving State depends upon residence or domicile, periods during which a member of a force or civilian
component is in the territory of the State by reason solely of his being a member of such
force or civilian component shall not be considered as periods of residence therein, or as
creating a change of residence or domicile, for the purposes of such taxation. Members
of a force or civilian component shall be exempt from taxation in the receiving State
on the salary and emoluments paid to them as such members by the sending State or on
any tangible movable property the presence of which in the receiving State is due solely
to their temporary presence there.
2. Nothing in this Article shall prevent taxation of a member of a force or civilian
component with respect to any profitable enterprise, other than his employment as such
member, in which he may engage in the receiving State, and, except as regards his salary
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and emoluments and the tangible movable property referred to in paragraph 1, nothing
in this Article shall prevent taxation to which, even if regarded as having his residence
or domicile outside the territory of the receiving State, such member is liable under the
law of that State.
3. Nothing in this Article shall apply to "duty" as defined in paragraph 12 of Article
Xl.
4. For the purpose of this Article the term "member of a force" shall not include
any person who is a national of the receiving State.

